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Abstract
Tying a good produced monopolistically with a complementary
good produced in an oligopolistic market in which there is room for
collusion can be proÞtable if some buyers of the oligopoly good have
no demand for the monopoly good. The reason is that a tie makes
part of the demand in the oligopolistic market out of the reach of the
tying Þrms rivals, which decreases the proÞtability of deviating from
a collusive agreement. Tying may thus facilitate collusion. It may also
allow the tying Þrm to alter market share allocation in the collusive
oligopolistic market.
1 Introduction
This paper shows that a Þrm enjoying a monopoly in market A while also
being active in an oligopolistic market B may Þnd it proÞtable to tie products
in both markets in order to facilitate collusion in market B.1 We consider a
model in which a fraction of buyers wants goods A and B in Þxed proportions
while other buyers want only product B and do not care about product A.
In such a context, the "Chicago critique" (or "single monopoly critique") of
the leveraging theory, which stresses that raising the price of product A is
∗Keywords: bundling, tying, collusion. JEL classiÞcation: L13
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (joint research unit, CNRS-EHESS-ENPC-ENS),
48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France. Email: spector@pse.ens.fr
1In this introduction, we use both the words "tying" and "bundling", because, as is
shown below, the results hold both in the case of an irreversible technical tie and in the
case of a reversible (e.g., contractual) bundling strategy.
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a suﬃcient instrument for the product A monopolist to extract consumers
surplus, breaks down, because raising the price of product A does not allow
the monopolist to extract surplus from the consumers who only want product
B.
One way to extract surplus from these consumers is to collude in market
B, and this paper shows that tying may help the product A monopolist to
extract surplus by colluding in market B. We prove two results. First, for
some parameter values, tying can make collusion in market B possible, which
beneÞts both the tying Þrm and its competitors in market B, and harms
consumers. Second, for parameter values such that collusion in market B is
feasible irrespective of whether products A and B are tied, tying may allow
the market A monopolist to increase its market share in market B, and thus
its proÞt.
The mechanism behind this result is very simple. Collusion is feasible
to the extent that each Þrm is deterred from deviating from the collusive
agreement by slightly undercutting competitors. This is where tying helps:
if the product A monopolist makes it mandatory for purchasers of product
A to also buy product B from it, it insulates a fraction of the demand (that
emanating from the fraction of consumers who want both products) from
competition. As a consequence, tying makes it less attractive for market
B Þrms (other than the product A monopolist) to deviate from any given
collusive agreement, because the consumers who want both products are out
of their reach anyway. This has two consequences. First, since the incentive
compatibility constraint facing the Þrms other than the productAmonopolist
is relaxed, the set of parameter values inducing the existence of a collusive
equilibrium expands: collusion becomes more likely. Second, for parameter
values inducing collusion both with and without tying, tying expands the set
of market share allocations which can be sustained in a collusive agreement.
More precisely, since all Þrms (except the market A monopolists) incentive
compatibility conditions are relaxed, collusion becomes feasible for market
share divisions which are more favorable to the market A monopolist. Thus,
tying a good in a monopolistic market with a complementary good in a
collusive market may allow the tying Þrm to increase its market share in
the collusive market. These results are proved Þrst in the case where the
tying good monopolist has the option to irreversibly tie its products before
the repeated oligopolistic interaction takes place (sections 2 and 3). We then
show that they carry over to the case where the tying good monopolist cannot
make any once-and-for-all commitment to bundle, but instead can decide in
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every period whether or not to oﬀer a bundle (section 4).
Relation to the literature
Two strands of the vast literature on bundling2 are related to the present
paper. One of them, initiated by Whinston (1990) has shown that in the
presence of economies of scale, a tying-market monopolist can use tying in
order to deter entry in the tied market by preventing potential entrants from
reaching the minimum viable scale. This strategy can be proÞtable if some
tied-market customers have no demand for the tying product: in this case, the
Chicago critique breaks down, because the extension of monopoly to the tied
market increases the tying good monopolists proÞt by allowing it to exploit
these consumers.3 The present paper is based on a similar demand structure:
some consumers in the tied market also want the tying product, some do
not, and tying allows the tying market monopolist to increase the proÞt it
extracts from the latter group. However, in the present paper the proÞtability
of bundling does not result from its entry-deterring or exit-inducing virtues,
but rather from its impact on the feasibility of collusion. Accordingly, the
results of this paper do not rely on any assumption about economies of scale
in the tied market.
A second strand of literature has shown that bundling may allow a Þrm
to mitigate competition by increasing diﬀerentiation.4 While the idea in the
present paper is also that bundling may mitigate competition, the mechanism
is diﬀerent. The existing literature compares non-cooperative equilibria with
and without bundling, while the present paper shows that bundling may
allow Þrms to shift from non-cooperation to cooperation, or may change
the division of market shares when the tied market is collusive anyway. Two
other diﬀerences distinguish the present paper from that literature. First, the
present results rely on the assumption that the two goods are complements.
Second, in the present paper, the tying Þrm sells both a bundle and the tied
product alone, and this point is crucial, because it is through the sale of
the tied product alone that the tying Þrm can reap the beneÞts of collusion.
On the contrary, the results showing that bundling can mitigate competition
2The literature on bundling is surveyed in Nalebuﬀ (2002), which in particular sum-
marises the main critiques of the single monopoly critique.
3Carlton and Waldman (2002) present a modiÞed version of this argument in the case
where there are intertemporal economies of scale or network eﬀects.
4Carbajo et al. (1990), Seidmann (1991), Chen (1997).
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by increasing diﬀerentiation usually consider the situation in which the Þrm
oﬀering a bundle does not also oﬀer the tied product alone. This is because
the diﬀerentiation between diﬀerent Þrms oﬀerings drives the results: some
of them oﬀer the bundle alone, while others oﬀer products on a standalone
basis.
2 The model
2.1 Agents, preferences and costs
There are two homogeneous goods, labeled A and B. Firm M can produce
both goods at zero cost, while Firm E can produce only product B, at zero
cost as well. Product B is not diﬀerentiated: the varieties produced by Firms
M and E are perfect substitutes for consumers.
A continuum of consumers of total mass one exists and is subdivided into
two groups. A mass b of consumers want to consume goods A and B in Þxed
amounts (one unit of each). All these consumers have a valuation V1 for the
pair consisting of one unit of each good. A mass (1 − b) of consumers has
no utility for product A. These consumers have a unit demand for product
B and a common valuation V2 < V1.We assume that price discrimination is
not possible since the good can be resold.
The rate of time preference of both Þrms is denoted δ.5
2.2 The game
We consider the following timing.
 In period 0, Firm M decides whether or not it will tie products A and
B. This decision is irreversible and cannot be made at any later stage.
If it decides to tie, Firm M will be able to oﬀer two products at the
later stages of the game: (i) a pair containing one unit of product A
and one unit of product B, and (ii) product B alone. If it decides not
5The results of this paper would carry over to the case of heterogeneous rates of time
preference. The assumption of a uniform rate is made for the sake of simplicity (with
heterogeneous rates, the optimal collusive equilibria may not be stationary). For a gen-
eral analysis of collusion between Þrms with heterogeneous discount rates, see Harrington
(1989).
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to tie, it will be able to oﬀer two products: (i) product A alone, and
(ii) product B alone.
 In periods 1,2,3,... until inÞnity, both Þrms simultaneously set prices for
the products they sell (i.e. Firm M sets the prices of its two products,
which are either products A and B, or an A − B pair and product
B, and Firm E sets the price of the product B it sells). In addition,
we assume that each Þrm announces, in each period, the maximum
amount of product B it is willing to sell. Then, if both Þrms set the
same price for product B, consumers who want to purchase product B
are allocated to both Þrms pro rata the announced amounts.
The last assumption (i.e. the assumption that each Þrm sets the maxi-
mum amount of product B it is willing to sell) is there to take into account
the possibility of diﬀerent divisions of market B.6
3 Tying and collusion
3.1 Conditions for the existence of a collusive equilib-
rium
In order to solve the above game by backward induction, we investigate the
feasibility of collusion depending on whether Firm E chose to tie products A
and B in period zero. The following lemma, proved in the appendix, charac-
terizes optimal equilibria.
Lemma Assume that the repeated game has collusive equilibria (i.e. equi-
libria with payoﬀs diﬀerent from those of the one-shot game), and consider
a Pareto-optimal subgame perfect equilibrium EQ (i.e. one which is optimal
from the point of view of the two Þrms, within the set of all subgame perfect
equilibria). Then (i) this equilibrium is such that the price of product B is
equal to V2 in every period ; and there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium
yielding the same payoﬀs as EQ and such that (ii) each players equilibrium
payoﬀ is identical across periods, and (iii) after any deviation oﬀ the equilib-
rium path, each Þrms action in the continuation game is the one prescribed
by the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game.
6This is similar to the modeling of market share proposals in Athey and Bagwell (2001).
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This lemma means that the analysis can be carried out by limiting our
attention to simple equilibria, namely those in which the equilibrium path
involves both players quoting the monopoly price V2 and a constant market
share allocation, while any deviation from these strategies leads each player to
earn the proÞt it would earn in the equilibrium of the one-shot game forever
after the period during which the deviation took place. This simpliÞcation
allows us to analyze the possibility of collusion as follows, depending on
whether Firm M decided to tie both products or not in period 0.
Case 1: Firm M chose not to tie products A and B in period 0.
The above lemma means that a hypothetical collusive equilibrium is
equivalent to one characterized by the following "tit-for-tat" strategies for
some α between zero and one (denoting the share of the total market for
product B attributed to Firm M):
 If no deviation occurred in any past period (i.e. if the actions described
hereafter have been played by both Þrms in all previous periods) then
both Þrms play as follows:
- FirmM sets the price of product A at V1−V2 and oﬀers product
B at price V2. It announces that it wants to sell at most α of product
B.
- Firm E oﬀers product B at price V2. It announces that it wants
to sell at most 1− α of product B.
 If either Þrm deviated from the above-mentioned actions in any previ-
ous period, then
- Firm M sets the price of product A at V1 and oﬀers product B
at price zero.
- Firm E oﬀers product B at price zero.
These strategies are equilibrium strategies only if, for each Þrm, the short-
term gain from deviating is smaller than the long-term loss from Bertrand
competition in market B. For Firm M , the long-term beneÞt from col-
lusion comes from the fact that without collusion, Firm M would only
extract surplus from the group of consumers (of total mass b) who want
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both products, earning per-period proÞts equal to bV1, while collusion al-
lows it to extract the entire surplus of a population of mass α, earning
b(V1 − V2) + αV2 = bV1 + (α − b)V2 per period. If it deviates, Firm M
earns bV1 + (1 − b)V2 during one period and bV1 in all subsequent periods.
With a rate of time preference δ, the condition for Firm M not to deviate is
thus
α− b ≥ (1− b)(1− δ). (1)
Similarly, FirmE earns a per-period proÞt of (1−α)V2 if no Þrm ever deviates,
while if it deviates it earns V2 for one period and zero ever after. The condition
for Firm E not to deviate is thus
1− α ≥ 1− δ. (2)
Collusion with a division of marketB according to the proportions (α, 1− α)
is feasible only if conditions (1) and (2) hold, i.e.
1− (1− b)δ ≤ α ≤ δ. (3)
Case 2: Firm M chose to tie products A and B in period 0.
Just as in Case 1, the lemma means that a hypothetical collusive equilib-
rium is equivalent to one characterized by the following "tit-for-tat" strategies
for some α between zero and one (denoting the share of the total market for
product B attributed to Firm M , including the part that is tied to market
A):
 If no deviation occurred in any past period (i.e. if the actions described
hereafter have been played by both Þrms in all previous periods) then
both Þrms play as follows:
- FirmM sets the price of the A−B pair at V1 and oﬀers product
B at price V2. It announces that it wants to sell at most α−b of product
B on a standalone basis (amounting to total sales of product B equal
to α once the sales of the A−B pair are accounted for).
- Firm E oﬀers product B at price V2. It announces that it wants
to sell at most 1− α of product B.
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 If either Þrm deviated from the above-mentioned actions in any previ-
ous period, then
- FirmM sets the price of the A−B pair at V1 and oﬀers product
B at price zero.
- Firm E oﬀers product B at price zero.
The incentives facing Firm M are the same as in the previous case: not
deviating is optimal if condition (1) holds. But the incentives facing Firm E
are diﬀerent from those arising in the previous case: if it deviates by slightly
lowering its price, Firm E captures the entire set of consumers who want
only product B (their total mass is 1 − b), but no more. As a consequence,
the one-period proÞt from deviating is not V2 anymore, but (1−b)V2 instead.
The condition for Firm E not to deviate when Firm M tied both products
is thus
1− α ≥ (1− b)(1− δ). (4)
Collusion with a division of marketB according to the proportions (α, 1− α)
is feasible only if conditions (1) and (4) both hold, i.e.
1− (1− b)δ ≤ α ≤ δ + b(1− δ). (5)
3.2 Main results
3.2.1 Tying in order to facilitate collusion
Conditions (3) and (5) yield the following result.
Proposition 1 If the rate of time preference δ is greater than 1
2
but smaller
than 1
2−b , then collusion is possible only if Firm M decides to tie products A
and B before the repeated pricing game took place.
This proposition is in accordance with the intuition explained in the in-
troduction: tying decreases the proÞtability of deviation for Firm E because
it insulates the tied part of market B from competition. This in turn makes
it easier to deter it from deviating from collusive equilibria.
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3.2.2 Tying in order to increase market share in a collusive market
Even in situations in which collusion would be feasible both with and without
tying (i.e. when both conditions (3) and (5) hold for some values of α), tying
may be proÞtable because because it increases the maximal market share
which can be allocated to Firm M in a collusive equilibrium. In order to see
this, we simply assume that after the decision whether to tie is made, Þrms
bargain over the choice of a collusive equilibrium (i.e., they bargain over α),
without making any side payments - this last assumption is very common in
the analysis of collusion, because side payments are often more diﬃcult to
conceal than price-Þxing or market share allocation.
We assume that Þrms coordinate on a collusive outcome using Nash bar-
gaining, i.e. they choose an equilibrium maximizing θΠM +(1− θ)ΠE, where
Πi denotes the expected discounted sum of Firm is proÞts, and the para-
meter θ denotes Firm M s bargaining power relative to Firm E. The above
characterization of feasible market share allocations in collusive equilibria
(conditions (3) and (5) above, corresponding respectively to the case with-
out and with tying) yields the following result.
Proposition 2 If 1
2−b < δ < θ, then collusion is feasible both without and
with tying, but tying causes the tying Þrms market share to rise from δ to
Min(θ, δ + b(1− δ)), and its proÞt to increase by Min(θ − δ, b(1− δ))V2.
This result is related to the familiar idea that tying may help a Þrm to
proÞtably increase its market share in the market in which it does not hold
a monopoly. If, absent tying, Firm M s market share in the tied market is
limited not by its bargaining power, but by the need to leave Firm E a large
enough market share (so as to deter it from deviating), then tying allows
Firm M to increase its market share, and thus its proÞt, because it relaxes
Firm Es incentive compatibility constraint.
4 Bundling and collusion
We assumed so far that the choice whether to tie products A and B was made
once and for all before competitive interaction takes place. This restriction
means that the above results, stated as such, can only apply to situations
involving an irreversible (or at least costly enough) technical tie, or when a
credible commitment to bundle (economically equivalent to a technical tie)
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is possible. However, many real-world situations involve mere commercial
bundling, which often is easily reversible. We show in this section that the
above results extend to commercial bundling without commitment.
We modify the game in order to model a situation in which the choice
whether to bundle products A and B is made not once and for all before com-
petitive interaction takes place, but rather in every period, simultaneously as
decisions over prices. More precisely, we assume that in every period, both
Þrms simultaneously make and announce the following choices:
 FirmM announces which products it wants to sell (i.e. A and B, or the
A−B pair and B) and at what price, as well as the maximum amount
of product B it is willing to sell should both Þrms oﬀer it at the same
price.
 Firm E sets the price at which is sells product B as well as the maxi-
mum amount of product B it is willing to sell should both Þrms oﬀer
it at the same price.
One can easily check that, if parameters induce the existence of a collusive
equilibrium with tying under the assumptions of the previous section, then
an equilibrium with bundling in every period and exactly the same prices and
market shares exists under the assumptions of the previous section. Consider
the following strategies:
 If no deviation occurred in any past period (i.e. if the actions described
hereafter have been played by both Þrms in all previous periods) then
both Þrms play as follows:
- Firm M decides to oﬀer only an A−B bundle priced V1 as well
as product B priced V2, and it announces that it wants to sell at most
α−b of product B when sold alone (amounting to total sales of product
B equal to α once the sales of the A−B pair are accounted for).
- Firm E oﬀers product B at price V2 and announces that it wants
to sell at most 1− α of product B.
 If either Þrm deviated from the above-mentioned actions in any previ-
ous period, then
- Firm M oﬀers product A at price V1, and product B at price
zero.
- Firm E oﬀers product B at price zero.
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The conditions for deviation to be proÞtable are exactly the same as in
the game analyzed in the previous section, assuming that in period 0 Firm
M had decided to tie both products. Indeed, if Firm E deviates, its proÞt
during the deviation period is (1− b)V2 rather than V2, because bundling by
Firm M prevents Firm E from selling anything to a mass b of consumers.
The fact that bundling may arise in equilibrium is not in itself very in-
teresting, because equilibrium multiplicity in repeated games is a general
phenomenon. The interesting result is that the possibility of bundling (i) in-
creases the set of parameters for which collusion is feasible, and (ii) increases
the set of market share divisions which are compatible with a collusive equi-
librium. Indeed, the above reasoning implies that the results of the previous
section carry over to the present one: the word "tying" can be replaced by
"bundling" in Propositions 1 and 2.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that bundling or tying may be a proÞtable strategy because
it may facilitate collusion in the tied market or it may allow the tying Þrm
to alter market share allocation in the collusive tied market. Contrary to
much of the recent literature, the anticompetitive use of bundling or tying is
possible even in the absence of economies of scale or scope in the tied market.
The only conditions for the above model to be relevant is that collusion be
feasible in the tied market, i.e. in particular that this market be transparent
enough, that quick retaliation be feasible, and that entry be diﬃcult enough
to make the collective exercise of market power possible. How relevant this
simple model is to real markets is an issue left for future empirical research.
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7 Appendix
Proof of the lemma.
In order to simplify notations, we consider the case where b = 0, which avoids the
need to consider tying; the proof easily carries over to the case b > 0 (the important
assumption is that each Þrm can guarantee itself at least its one-shot Bertrand proÞt
whatever its rivals strategies are). Consider a hypothetical collusive equilibrium (i.e. an
equilibrium such that aggregate expected proÞts are strictly positive) which is Pareto-
optimal (from the Þrms viewpoint) within the set of subgame perfect equilibria. We
introduce the following notations:
 Uit denotes the proÞt earned in equilibrium by agent i (i.e. FirmM orE) in period
t.
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 Vit = (1− δ)
X
t0≥t+1
δt
0−t−1Uit0 denotes agent is average equilibrium per-period
proÞt from period t+ 1 on.
 pt denotes the equilibrium price in the period t.
 Pt denotes the average equilibrium price in periods t + 1 and after, deÞned as
Pt = (1− δ)
X
t0≥t+1
δt
0−t−1pt0
 αit denotes Firm is equilibrium market share in period t.
These notations imply the identities αMt+αEt = 1 and Uit = αitpt. We can apply
the results about optimal penal codes derived in Abreu (1988): all equilibria are equivalent
(in terms of payoﬀs) to equilibria such that out-of-equilibrium strategies involve optimal
punishments. In the simple case of price competition with identical marginal cost, the
optimal punishment is simply to play the strategies corresponding to the equilibrium of
the one-shot game, because each player can guarantee itself the corresponding payoﬀs (i.e.,
zero) whatever the other players strategy. We thus limit our attention to equilibria such
that after any deviation, both players forever play the strategies corresponding to the
one-shot game (i.e., they set a zero price).
In equilibrium, no Þrm has an incentive to deviate from its equilibrium strategy by
slightly undercutting its rival. Therefore, for i = E andM :
Ujt= (1− αit)pt≤
δ
1− δVit. (ICit)
We prove Þrst that for every t, pt is equal to the monopoly price V2. Assume that
this is not the case, and that for some t0, pt0 < V2.
Two cases must be distinguished, according to whether pt0 is smaller or greater than
Pt0 .
First case: pt0 ≥ Pt0. We deÞne
p = (1− δ)pt0 + δPt0
and αi by the equality
αi p = (1− δ)
X
t≥t0
δt−t0αitpt.
These deÞnitions imply in particular that αM + αE = 1.We consider now the following
change to the original equilibrium strategies: in period t and in all subsequent periods,
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Firm i announces a price p and a market share αi; out-of-equilibrium strategies are the
same as in the original equilibrium. Clearly, these new strategies do not aﬀect conditions
(ICit) for t < t0 since they leave each Þrms expected discounted payoﬀ between t0 and
inÞnity unchanged. In order to check whether these strategies can be equilibrium strategies,
it is necessary to check whether the condition (ICit) still holds for t ≥ t0. This condition
is equivalent to
αi ≥ 1− δ. (6)
But (ICit0) implies that
αi p ≥ (1− δ)pt0,
implying that (6) holds, because the inequality pt0 ≥ Pt0 implies that p ≤ pt0. Also,
p > 0 : if the equilibrium under consideration yields strictly positive aggregate proÞts,
then it is not possible that all prices be equal to zero after a certain period (otherwise by
backward induction prices could be shown to be zero in all periods), so that Pt0 > 0,
and thus p > 0. Consider now the following modiÞed strategies: in every period t, Firm i
announces a price V2 and a market share αi. Clearly, these strategies are compatible with
an equilibrium: if t ≥ t0, (ICit) still holds since the left-hand and right-hand term are
both multiplied by V2/p; if t < t0, (ICit) still holds since the left-hand side is unchanged
while the right-hand side increases. But the corresponding equilibrium yields each Þrm a
greater proÞt than the original one, since the average price after period t0 is multiplied by
V2/p, which is greater than one (since pt0 < V2). Therefore the initial equilibrium could
not be optimal from the point of view of Þrms.
Second case: pt0 < Pt0. Notice Þrst that (ICEt0) and (ICMt0) are necessarily both
binding: if (ICit0) were not binding, a small price increase in period t0, together with
a market share reallocation leaving Firm is proÞt unchanged (and thus slightly increas-
ing Firm js) would be a Pareto improvement and would leave all the (ICit) and (ICjt)
constraints satisÞed. Therefore,
(1− αEt0)pt0 =
δ
1− δVEt0
and
(1− αMt0)pt0 =
δ
1− δVMt0,
implying that
pt0 =
δ
1− δ (VEt0 + VMt0) =
δ
1− δPt0
and thus that
δ
1− δ =
pt0
Pt0
< 1.
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But conditions (ICEt) and (ICMt) imply that for every t, (UEt+UMt) <
δ
1−δ (VEt+
VMt), or (VEt+VMt) >
1−δ
δ
(UEt+UMt). Since (VEt+VMt) is a weighted average of
all values of (UEt0 +UMt0) in periods t
0 ≥ t+1, this implies that for any t, there exists
t0 > t such that UEt0+UMt0
UEt+UMt
≥ 1−δ
δ
> 1. This implies that there exists a sequence tn
such that UEtn + UMtn ≥ (UEt0 + UMt0)
¡
1−δ
δ
¢n
= pt0
¡
1−δ
δ
¢n
, which tends toward
inÞnity as n does. This is clearly a contradiction, since UEt + UMt is bounded above by
the one-period monopoly proÞt V2.
This proves that the price in any optimal collusive equilibrium is equal to V2 in every
period. Then, let us deÞne αi by the equality
αi = (1− δ)
X
t≥0
δtαit.
Condition (ICi0) is equivalent to αi ≥ 1 − δ, which implies that there exists an
equilibrium such that in every period the price is equal to V2 and market shares are
αM , αE. This equilibrium yields the same payoﬀs as the original one. This completes
the proof: an optimal collusive equilibrium is such that the price is equal to the short-
run monopoly price in every period; there necessarily exists an equilibrium yielding the
same payoﬀs and characterized by constant market shares, and such that any deviation is
followed by the repetition of the short-run the Bertrand equilibrium.
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